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CONSTITUTIONALIZING FORFEITURE LAW-THE GERMAN 
EXAMPLE 
James R. Maxeiner* 
In the United States a common legal consequence of the com-
mission of crime is forfeiture of property used to violate the law. 
Confiscation of an automobile used to smuggle drugs is a typical ex-
ample. In most cases the function of forfeiture is either to punish 
criminals or to prevent further use of the property in crime. Forfei-
ture statutes are closely connected with the criminal law and ought 
to be analysed with that branch of law, but in the United States for-
feiture law has achieved an existence wholly apart from criminal 
law. That separate existence is attributable to an historical accident 
in the 19th century when forfeiture came to be thought an exclu-
sively civil sanction necessarily imposed in an in rem action.1 This 
characterization focused attention on the property and tended to ob-
scure the relation between the property forfeited and the criminal 
involvement of its owner. For the last half century the question 
whether government may permissibly take citizens' property in a 
forfeiture action has been determined by a single consideration-
whether the property has been used in unlawful activity.2 
This simplification of the question of forfeiture has caused many 
unjust confiscations. Owners guilty of only minor infractions have 
sometimes been subjected to disproportionate forfeitures.3 Wholly 
innocent owners have frequently lost their property when someone 
else, without their knowledge, used the property to commit crime.4 
• JAMES R. MAXEINER is Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, U. S. Department of 
Justice. I would like to thank Professors G. Robert Blakey, Albin Eser, and George 
Fletcher for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The views ex-
pressed here are my own and not necessarily those of the Justice Department. 
1. See generally Note, "Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?," 
62 Cornell L. Rev. 768,779-792 (1977). 
2. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); J.W. 
Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921). 
3. See e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1970 Lincoln Auto., 212 Va. 597, 186 S.E.2d 279 
(1972) (upholding forfeiture of $8700 automobile for driving with a revoked license). 
4. See e.g., United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 
1977). The owner is subject to strict as well as vicarious liability: unwitting illegal 
635 
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Again and again owners have unsuccessfully raised constitutional 
objections to confiscation of property without compensation. Ameri-
can courts have most frequently replied with an analogy to the me-
dieval law of deodand, in which they find the origin of modern 
enactments.5 The deodand was the instrument of a man's death; it 
was forfeit as "guilty property" regardless of the owner's culpabil-
ity.6 This fiction has allowed most American courts to avoid analysis 
of forfeiture. It is probably not the principal reason our courts have 
resisted constitutional challenges; rather, they have allowed far 
reaching confiscations because of the remedial purposes seen to be 
served by some forfeitures: the principal idea is that taking the 
property prevents its future illegal use.7 American courts have 
tended to neglect the punitive side of forfeiture, since punishment 
seems inconsistent with an in rem action.8 
In the last fifteen years some American courts have subjected 
modern forfeiture statutes to closer scrutiny. Five federal courts 
and three state supreme courts have held forfeiture statutes uncon-
stitutional on substantive grounds.9 Four other state supreme 
courts have avoided constitutional attacks by narrow statutory con-
struction.1o In 1974 the United States Supreme Court slowed the 
trend against forfeiture in the federal courts by reversing a three 
judge district court that had found one statute unconstitutional.ll 
use incurs forfeiture. Combining the two forms of liability means that an automobile 
can be confiscated where neither the owner nor the driver knows of the unlawful use. 
See e.g., United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Auto., 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1957) (or-
dering forfeiture where passenger carried 1/3Oth ounce marijuana without driver's 
knowledge). 
5. "It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, 
held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and in-
sentient." Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 
(1931). See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 682; J.W. Gold-
smith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. at 510-11; United States v. One Buick 
Skylark, 453 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Colo. 1978). 
6. See Note, supra n. 1 at 771-72. 
7. See e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 687; Commis-
sioner's Note to Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 505. 
8. See e.g., United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied 409 U.S. 850 (1972). 
9. McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971); Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 
346 F. Supp. 613 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 
1972); United States v. One Bally Sun Valley Pinball Machine, 340 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. 
La. 1972); In re One 1965 Mustang, 105 Ariz. 293, 463 P.2d 827 (1970); 1957 Chevrolet v. 
Division of Narcotic Control, 27 Ill.2d 429, 189 N.E.2d 347 (1963); State v. 1971 Green 
GMC Van, 354 So.2d 479 (La. 1977). Several other state courts have struck down for-
feiture statutes on procedural grounds. See People v. Campbell, 39 Mich. App. 443, 
198 N.W.2d 7 (1972); State v. Miller, 248 N.W.2d 377 (S. Dak. 1976); Rumfolo v. State, 
535 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), rev'd 545 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1977); State v. One 1972 
Mercury Capri, 85 Wash.2d 620, 537 P.2d 763 (1975). 
10. One Cocktail Glass v. State, 565 P.2d 1265 (Alaska 1977); Griffis v. State, 356 
So.2d 297 (Fla. 1978). State v. One 1972 Grand Prix 2-Door Hardtop, 242 N.W.2d 660 (S. 
Dak. 1976); State v. One Porsche 2-Door, 526 P.2d 917 (Utah 1974). 
11. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
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The Court nevertheless encouraged a limited reform of the law by 
recognizing that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional 
claim of an owner ... [who] had done all that could reasonably be 
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property."12 In the 
state courts the trend against forfeiture has continued.13 Congress 
has also created a need to reconsider forfeiture law. In 1972 it 
amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require that 
"criminal forfeitures" (as contrasted to "civil forfeitures") be im-
posed in criminal prosecution of the owner.14 Congress did not 
specify what constitutes a criminal forfeiture. Taking these events 
of recent years together, it is clear that American courts must now 
fully reassess forfeiture law. 
With few precedents to guide them, American courts will of ne-
cessity move slowly in their reconsideration. That reconsideration 
could be expedited if a systematic exposition of forfeiture and con-
stitutional principles could be found. The dearth of American analy-
sis suggests considering the approaches of other legal systems. 
In Germany, legal scholarship in the field of forfeiture is exten-
sive. Germany has long had forfeiture provisions comparable to our 
own. With the adoption of the American-inspired West German con-
stitution, German scholars, judges, and legislators acted to modify 
their law, including its forfeiture provisions, to bring it into accord 
with strengthened constitutional guarantees. In the two decades be-
tween 1949 and 1968 German lawyers have dealt at length with the 
same problems now facing American forfeiture law. I5 
GERMAN FORFEITURE STATUTES 
§ 40 of the German Criminal Code of 1871 mandated that 
" [ 0 ] bjects produced by a deliberate felony or misdemeanor, or used 
or intended for committing a deliberate felony or misdemeanor, may 
be forfeited if they belong to the principal perpetrator or an accom-
plice."16 § 40 remained essentially unchanged until superseded in 
12. Id. at 689. For developments of this theme, see United States v. One 1972 
Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1977); Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 
1976); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979); 
United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR 9, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
13. See the cases decided after 1974 cited in n. 9 & 10 supra. Other state courts 
relying on Calero-Toledo have rejected constitutional challenges. See State v. 36 Pin-
ball Machines, 565 P.2d 236 (Kan. 1977); State v. One 1968 Volkswagen, 198 Neb. 45, 251 
N.W.2d 666 (1977). 
14. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2), 31(c), 32(b)(2), 54(b)(5). See Advisory Committee's 
Comments to the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 
F.R.D. 143, 180 (1972); Note, supra n. 1 at 792-93. 
15. Throughout this article references to Germany after 1948 are to the Federal 
Republic (West Germany). This article makes no attempt to examine forfeiture law 
other than in Germany and the United States. For a limited comparison of forfeiture 
in civil law countries, see Scharff, "Die Einziehung," in Materialien zur Strajrechts-
reform vol. 2, Allgemeiner Teil at 253-59 (1954). Scharff suggests that forfeiture has 
not been systematically considered elsewhere; in common law countries, see Com-
ment, "Forfeiture remission, a comparative study," 8 Calif. W. Int. L. Rev. 586 (1978). 
16. Reichsstrafgesetzbuch [RStGBl § 40 (1871) [all translations are mine unless 
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1968P While § 40 placed forfeiture in the discretion of the trial 
judge, other statutes required the judge to order forfeiture in all 
cases, even though in some instances the property belonged to an 
innocent third party. Following the adoption of the Basic Law (the 
West German Constitution) in 1949, some of the broader-reaching 
forfeiture statutes were criticized as inconsistent with the Basic 
Law.I8 In 1951 the Federal Supreme Court held in effect that earlier 
forfeiture statutes could be enforced only in conformity with the 
constitution. 19 
As the Federal Supreme Court began to reassess forfeiture law, 
German lawyers began consideration of a new criminal code to re-
place the 1871 code. Various proposals culminated in the draft 
presented to the West German parliament in 1962. Four years later 
a group of liberal criminal law professors published an alternative 
draft of the general part of the code. Eventually compromises were 
reached and in 1975 a new criminal code became fully effective.2o 
One goal of the drafters of the new criminal code was to bring 
German forfeiture statutes into conformity with the Basic Law,21 
and accordingly they made changes throughout German forfeiture 
law.22 The reform culminated -in the Regulatory Offenses Act of 1968 
and the accompanying introductory legislation.23 That act includes 
a new scheme of forfeiture law formulated on a constitutional ba-
otherwise noted). Gegenstltnde when it appears in the 1871 code is translated as "ob-
jects," but as ''property'' when it appears in the new forfeiture legislation. See n. 141-
42 and accompanying text infra. For translations of the 1871 Criminal Code, see 
Drage, The Criminal Code 'a/the German Empire (1885); Gsirski & James, The Statu-
tory Criminal Law 0/ Germany (1947); Mueller & Buergenthal, German Penal Code 
(Am. Series of Foreign Penal Codes vol. 4,1961). The predecessors of § 40 go back to 
the 1805 Prussian Criminal Code. See Judgment of 5 December 1956, 10 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen [BGHSt) 28,30. 
17. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB) § 40 (1953); superseded by Act of 24 May 1968, 1968 
BGBl.I 503; StGB § 40 (1968); StGB § 74 (1975) [hereafter citations to the StGB with-
out date are to the 1975 code now in force]. 
18. See e.g., Hartung, "Die Einziehung nach dem § 414 RAbgO," 1949 Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift [NJW] 765. 
19. Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 BGHSt 351. 
20. See generally, Eser, "Germany [Politics of Criminal Law Reform]," 21 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 245 (1973); "Symposium, The New German Penal Code," 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 
589-778 (1976). 
21. Germany, Bundesministerium der Justiz, Entwurf des Allgemeinen Teils eines 
Strq/gesetzbuchs nach den Beschltlssen der Grossen Strafrechtskommission in Erster 
Lesung (abgeschlossen im Dezember 1956) mit Begrandung 109, 112-13, 115 (1958). 
The draft will be cited as Entwurf 1956, if to the proposed code; as Entwurf 1956 mit 
Begrandung, if to the accompanying commentary. The 1960 draft, Entwurf eines 
Stra/gesetzbuches 1960, and the 1962 draft, Entwurf eines Stra/gesetzbuches 1962, are 
cited in the same fashion. The 1962 draft has been translated, see Ross, German Draft 
Penal Code E 1962 (Am. Series of Foreign Penal Codes vol. 11, 1966). 
22. The first changes were made in the Duty and Impost Order. See Abgaben-
ordnung [AO] §§ 414-15 (1961). 
23. Gesetz Ober Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG] of 24 May 1968, 1968 BGBl.I 481; 
Einfohrungsgesetz zum Ordnungswidrigkeiten [EGOWiG] of 24 May 1968, 1968 
BGBl.I 503. See Eser, supra n. 20 at 250-51. 
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sis.24 The introductory legislation made analogous changes in the 
Criminal Code of 1871 and additional alterations in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure.25 The 1968 amendments to the old criminal 
code were incorporated with only minor changes in the new Crimi-
nal Code of 1975.26 
THE NATURE OF FORFEITURE-PuNISHMENT OR PREVENTIVE 
MEASURE? 
Since the enactment of § 40 in 1871, German scholarship has be-
gun consideration of forfeiture by looking to its legal nature. Early 
commentators argued that all forfeitures were alike; some saw for-
feitures as exclusively punishments, others considered them to be 
exclusively preventive measures.27 By about the turn of the century 
however, both earlier views were rejected. Courts and commenta-
tors then recognized that there were two different types of forfei-
ture, one type serving as punishment, the other as a preventive 
measure.28 This view of forfeiture as "ambivalent" has been almost 
universally held in German law ever since.29 Disagreement has cen-
tered on how one distinguishes the punitive forfeiture from the pre-
ventive. 
The Reich Supreme Court applied a simple test. If the statute 
allowed the forfeiture only of property owned by a principal or an 
accomplice, then the forfeiture was punitive. If the forfeiture ex-
tended to property generally, regardless of ownership, it was pre-
ventive.30 In the early years of the Federal Republic courts and 
24. OWiG §§ 22·29,87. 
25. StGB §§ 40-42 (1968); Strafprozessordnung [StPO) §§ 430-42. 
26. StGB §§ 74-76a. All citations to the 1968 reform will be to the code section of 
the legislation in force since 1975, and not to the section numbers used under the old 
StGB and the new OWiG from 1968 to 1974. 
27. See Dietrichs, "Die Strafrechtliche Einziehung und die Eigentumsgarantie 
des Grundgesetzes" 3 (Dissertation Hamburg 1964); Eser, Die Strafrechtlichen Sank-
tionen gegen das Eigentum 62-67 (1968) [hereafter Eser). 
28. Judgment of 18 June 1912, 46 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Straf-
sachen [RGSt) 379. Cf. Dochow, "Einziehung" in 1 Holtzendorff, Rechtslexikon 661 
(3d ed. 1880). See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 3-4; Eser at 67-70, 73-74. At almost the 
same time as Germany came to generally recognize the dual nature of forfeiture, 
America, which previously had recognized a similar punitive/regulatory distinction, 
began to abandon it. See Note, supra n. 1 at 783-91. 
29. See Dreher, Strajgesetzbuch mit Nebengesetzen und Verordnungen § 74 at 371 
(36th ed. 1976) [hereafter Dreher); Eser at 72-73; GOhler, Gesetz uber Ordnungs-
widrigkeiten 135-37 (5th ed. 1977) [hereafter GOhler, OWiG); Lackner, 
Strajgesetzbuch mit Erlauterungen § 74 at 342 (11th ed. 1977) [hereafter Lackner); 
Kleinknecht, Strafprozessordnung 887 (33d ed. 1977) [hereafter Kleinknecht, StPO); 
SchOnke & Schroder, Strajgesetzbuch Kommentar 790-91 (19th ed. 1977) (this section 
revised by Eser) [hereafter SchOnke-Schroder-Eser); SchOnke & SchrOder, 
Strajgesetzbuch Kommentar § 40 at 184-85 (12th ed. 1965) [hereafter SchOnke-SchrO-
der (12th ed.) I; Schwarz & Dreher, Strajgesetzbuch § 40 at 122-23 (29th ed. 1967) 
[hereafter Schwarz-Dreher); 1 Strajgesetzbuch Leipziger Kommentar § 40 margin no. 
1 (this section by Schafer) (9th ed. 1970-74) [hereafter Scha.fer LK). 
30. Judgment of 18 June 1912, 46 RGSt 131; Judgment of 29 January 1929, 63 RGSt 
379. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 4; Eser at 70-75. 
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commentators largely adhered to this position.31 Nevertheless, for 
constitutional purposes, the Federal Supreme Court chose to look to 
the underlying nature of the sanction. The Court admitted the puni-
tive nature of certain third-party forfeitures and thereby recognized 
a new classification, the so-called "punishment-like" forfeiture.32 
Since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 the characterization 
of the legal nature of forfeiture has assumed increased importance. 
The classification as punitive or preventive is a fundamental first 
step in constitutional analysis. A given forfeiture must satisfy the 
constitutional requirements of one classification or the other. A for-
feiture which is valid neither as a punishment nor as a measure to 
protect society is unconstitutional. Greater emphasis on the puni-
tive/preventive classification has resulted in courts and commenta-
tors reformulating the distinguishing test. The "essence and 
purpose" of the sanction are decisive. If the statute looks to the ac-
tor, if it is directed toward atonement for past wrong, the forfeiture 
is punitive, or, at least "punishment-like." If the statute looks to the 
property without regard to the guilt of the actor, if it contemplates 
resisting a danger to the community, then it is preventive.33 There-
fore punitive forfeiture is subjective and past-directed, whereas pre-
ventive forfeiture is objective and future-directed. Actor-related 
criteria are characteristic of punitive forfeitures, while property-re-
lated criteria are typical of preventive forfeitures.34 Despite the 
lesser rigidity of more recent law, Professors Eser and SchrOder 
have called for a broader, yet more individualized inquiry. They 
would look to all the circumstances, not just to legislative purpose. 
Moreover, they would make the characterization with respect to 
each individual case, rather than for all cases under one statute.3S 
Both the 1968 reform act and the 1975 code leave open the question 
of how to characterize individual forfeitures.36 
CONFORMING THE SUBSTANTIVE LAw TO THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Actor-Directed Punitive Forfeiture 
1. The Guilt Principle 
It is a fundamental principle of modern German law that pun-
31. Judgment of 31 March 1954, 6 BGHSt 62; Niethammer, Strajgesetzbuch § 40 at 
32-33 (1954); Schwarz-Dreher § 40 at 122-23. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 4-6; Eser at 
75-76. 
32. Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 BGHSt 351. Gilsdorf notes that in any case for 
constitutional purposes the determination of the nature of the sanction can't be left 
to legislative decision alone. Gilsdorf, "Die verfassungsrechtlichen Schranken der 
Einziehung," 1958 Juristenzeitung [JZ) 641,642 [hereafter Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ). For the 
''punishment-like'' forfeiture, see n. 63-93 and accompanying text infra. 
33. Judgment of 16 July 1965, 20 BGHSt 253; Eser at 90. 
34. Eser at 91; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser at 791. See also Lackner § 74 at 342; Scha-
fer LK § 40 margin nos. 4-8. 
35. Eser at 76-77, 92-97; Schonke-SchrOder-Eser at 791; SchOnke-Schroder § 40 at 
185 (12th ed.). Cf. Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 20-28. 
36. Entwurf 1956 mit Begrllndung at 109; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser at 790. 
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ishment may be imposed only for personal blameworthiness.37 This 
"principle of guilt" (Schuldprinzip) is of constitutional rank.3s As 
applied to forfeiture statutes, the principle requires blameworthi-
ness to support a punitive or "punishment-like" forfeiture. In the 
absence of guilty conduct, forfeiture is contrary to the guilt principle 
and cannot be justified except as a purely preventive measure.39 
Yet many statutes predating the 1949 constitution allowed or re-
quired forfeiture where the owner was not blameworthy and where 
the circumstances did not justify a preventive measure. In 1951 the 
Federal Supreme Court held that the effect of the Basic Law on 
these older statutes was to obligate the trial judge not to order a for-
feiture in violation of the guilt principle.40 Application of the guilt 
principle to German statutes has precluded forfeitures that are com-
monplace in the United States. For example, in Germany a punitive 
forfeiture cannot be ordered if the guilty actor has transferred his 
property to a bona fide purchaser.41 In America, not only is such a 
"relation back" possible, but our courts have construed it as charac-
teristic of all forfeiture statutes.42 Generally, in German law, an 
owner not subject to punishment in his person cannot be subject to 
punishment in his property. Thus a punitive forfeiture will not be 
permissible if the owner is dead, insane, or otherwise legally not 
subject to prosecution.43 The 1968 reform act largely codified these 
results. 
2. The Property Guarantee 
It is undisputed that a forfeiture imposed as punishment, 
37. Hamann, Grundgesetz und Strajgesetzgebung 17 (1963); Kaufmann, Das 
Schuldprinzip 15-20 (1961); MUller-Dietz, Grenzen des Schuldgedankens im Strajrecht 
29 (1967). . 
38. Judgment of 18 March 1952, 2 BGHSt 194; Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 686. The guilt 
principle is usually taken to originate in the guarantee of human dignity ("Men-
schenwOrde") of Art. 1 ~ 1 of the Basic Law. See Maunz & DOrig, Grundgesetz Kom-
mentar at Art. 1 margin no. 32 (supplemented through 1976). Cf. Kaufmann, supra n. 
37 at 116-211. For the place of the guilt principle in the Criminal Code of 1975, see 
Hermann, "Sanctions: German Law and Theory," 24 Am. J. Compo L. 719-21 (1976). 
39. SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 185 (12th ed.). 
40. Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 BGHSt 351, 353-54; Judgment of 16 June 1958, 27 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivil Sachen [BGHZl 69,71-72. In certain 
circumstances such a forfeiture might be permissible if accompanied by provision for 
full compensation of the innocent owner. Id. 
41. This was a statutory requirement of the old law. Schwarz-Dreher § 40 at 124. 
The 1956 draft proposal would have allowed this "relation back," but would have com-
pensated the bona fide purchaser. Entwurj 1956 §§ 120 cl. I, 125 ~ 1. This possibility 
was dropped in later drafts and as enacted, probably as pointless. Entwurj 1962 § 113; 
StGB § 74. As enacted, relation back is possible only if the subsequent taker is not 
bona fide. StGB § 74a cl. 2. See Eser at 218; Stree, Deliktsjolgen und Grundgesetz 115-
16 (1960). 
42. Florida Dealers & Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 
1960). See Note, supra n. 1 at 773 n. 37, 780 n. 74. 
43. Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 688; StGB § 76a; Schronke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 834; 
Schonke-SchrOder § 42 at 195 (12th ed.). Cf. Schwarz-Dreher § 40 at 124 (pre-War law 
contra). 
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though uncompensated, does not violate constitutional protections 
of property.44 Art. 14 of the Basic Law guarantees the right of prop-
erty: property may not be taken, except for the public good and by a 
law providing for appropriate compensation.45 Though it is agreed 
that forfeiture may be imposed as punishment without providing 
compensation, there is no general agreement as to the exact theoret-
ical source of this constitutional exception.46 The Federal Supreme 
Court has adopted a theory that the greater includes the lesser, that 
is, if the state may punish the guilty actor in his personal freedom, it 
may also punish him in his property.47 
3. The Proportionality Principle 
German forfeitures must also conform to proportionality princi-
ples. The proportionality principle (Grundsatz der verhaltnismas-
sigkeit) is a natural corollary to the guilt principle. Where the guilt 
principle demands blameworthiness as a necessary prerequisite to 
punishment, the proportionality principle requires that punishment 
not be disproportionate to blameworthiness (Schuld).48 Recognition 
of the constitutional rank of the proportionality principle in the 
early 1950s had a special effect on earlier German statutes that had 
placed forfeiture outside the trial judge's discretion and required 
forfeiture in all instances. The Federal Supreme Court held that the 
proportionality principle requires the trial judge to examine the spe-
44. Judgment of 16 June 1958, 27 BGHZ 382, 384; Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 29-30; 
Eser at 150-73. 
45. Art. 14 reads in pertinent part: 
(1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and 
limits shall be determined by the laws. 
(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal. 
(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be ef-
fected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature 
and extent of compensation. Such compensation shall be determined 
by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and 
the interest of those affected. 
Grundgesetz [GG I Art. 14, translation from Germany, Press & Information Office, Ba-
sic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 12 (1971). 
46. Some see the property as placed outside constitutional protection by virtue of 
an unwritten constitutional provision. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 29; Eser at 150-55; 
Stree, supra n. 41 at 87. Others contend that punitive forfeiture is an expropriation 
within the meaning of Art. 14, but one that does not require compensation. See Eser 
at 155-56; Stree, supra n. 41 at 88-90. Finally, many would find support for the sanction 
in one of the two clauses in Art. 14 limiting the right of property, either Art. 14 ~ 1 cl. 2 
or Art. 14 ~ 2. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 30; Eser at 166-73; Stree, supra n. 41 at 85-
90. 
47. Judgment of 16 June 1958, 27 BGHZ 382, 384. See KrOner, "Die Einziehung 
und Art. 14 GG," 1959 NJW 81, 82 [hereafter Kroner, 1959 NJW); Stree, supra n. 41 at 
87-88. 
48. The Bavarian Constitutional Court had already recognized the constitutional 
rank of the proportionality principle and its applicability to forfeiture in a judgment 
of 28 July 1950. Within a few years recognition was general. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 
at 31-34; Eser at 352-53; Maunz & DOrlg, supra n. 38 at Art. 1 margin no. 32; SchOnke-
SchrOder-Eser § 74b at 752-53; Silving, "Discussion of Sanctions," 24 Am. J. Compo L. 
737, 741-46 (1976). 
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cific situation before him for the degree of blameworthiness of the 
owner and for the harshness of the forfeiture. If the actor's guilt is 
slight and the severity of the forfeiture great, the judge must deny 
the forfeiture, notwithstanding mandatory language in the statute.49 
American forfeitures, on the other hand, need not conform to pro-
portionality principles, even though several state constitutions re-
quire proportionality in punishment and the federal constitution 
prohibits excessive fines.5o American courts, when faced with a 
challenge that a forfeiture is excessive, deny that forfeiture is a pun-
ishment, and thus avoid the question of proportionality altogether.51 
In German law the proportionality principle was so widely accepted 
as a constitutional requirement, that the 1962 draft proposal for the 
new criminal code omitted any specific forfeiture proportionality 
principle as unnecessary.52 As for mandatory forfeiture, the consti-
tutional requirement remains the only limitation.53 But in the case 
of forfeiture placed in the discretion of the trial judge, the 1968 re-
form act adds the further limitation that the judge shall not order a 
punitive or "punishment-like" forfeiture "if it would stand out of 
proportion to the consequences of the [illegal] deed committed and 
to the blame [worthiness of the person subjected to it ]."54 Thus 
whether the forfeiture is mandatory or discretionary makes a differ-
ence in the standard applied.55 Since the overwhelming trend of 
new enactments is to place forfeiture in the discretion of the 
judge,56 the more restrictive standard will increasingly be the one 
applicable. 
Application of the proportionality principle raises a number of 
questions. What makes a forfeiture excessive and therefore consti-
tutionally forbidden? It is difficult to state more than the general 
constitutional requirement. SchrOder considered a forfeiture to be 
constitutionally forbidden "if the iniquity of the deed and the actor's 
blameworthiness are so small, that the deprivation of the property 
.. would mean a disproportionate hardship."57 The statutory stan-
49. Judgment of 29 May 1970, 23 BGHSt 267, 269; Judgment of 17 October 1961, 16 
BGHSt 282,290; Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 38; Schonke-SchrOder-Eser § 74b at 817-18. 
50. See e.g., Ill. Const. art. I, § 11; Ind. Const. art I, § 16; Me. Const. art. I, § 9; Neb. 
Const. art. I, § 15; N.H. Const. art. I, § 18; Ore. Const. art. I, § 16; R.I. Const. art. I, § 8; 
W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5. 
51. Contrast Commonwealth v. One 1970 Lincoln Automobile, 212 Va. 597, 186 
S.E.2d 279 (1972) (upholding forfeiture of $8700 automobile for driving with a revoked 
license) with Hoffmann-Walldorf, "Kann ein Kraftfahrzeug wenn der Fahrer keinen 
Ftlhrerschein besitzt, eingezogen werden?," 1954 NJW 1147 (discussion of German 
case holding automobile not forfeit for driving without a license). 
52. Eser at 353 n. 19. 
53. SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74b at 817. 
54. StGB § 74b ~ 1. 
55. Judgment of 29 May 1970, 23 BGHSt 267, 269-70. 
56. Entwurj 1956 mit Begrtlndung at 109. 
57. SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 187 (12th ed.). In practice, the constitutional re-
quirement has meant that a youth's short wave radio could not be forfeit for occa-
sional transmission of music. Judgment of 15 December 1966, Bayerisches Oberstes 
. Landesgericht in 1967 NJW 586. Also, that an automobile could not be forfeit for the 
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dard of relationship of sanction to blameworthiness is even more 
difficult to state precisely. In general, the severity of the forfeiture 
must be considered in relation to the value of the object forfeit.58 
The problem is complicated by the usual nature of forfeiture as an 
all-or-nothing sanction. Taking the entire property may be too se-
vere, while taking nothing may be too lenient. 59 The 1968 reform act 
allows an intermediate, or partial, forfeiture where possible.6o A so-
lution may be found in what appears to be a growing consensus that 
the punitive forfeiture must be considered as a part of the overall 
punishment.61 Thus, if the forfeiture would otherwise be too severe, 
it could be made permissible by an appropriate reduction in the pri-
mary sentence. 
B. Third-Party Directed "Punishment-like" Forfeiture 
The so-called "punishment-like" (strafahnlich) forfeiture arises 
when an owner, not himself a principal or an accessory to crime, is 
nevertheless made to suffer forfeiture of property for some degree of 
personal fault in allowing the property to be used illegally. The 
third party has not himself committed a crime; he cannot be sanc-
tioned other than by the "punishment-like" forfeiture. Where the 
third party forfeiture proceeds on grounds of prevention of immi-
nent danger, it is not "punishment-like." 
The development of "punishment-like" forfeiture is a conse-
quence of the application of constitutional guarantees to the 
broad-reaching third-party forfeitures that predated the Basic Law. 
Before 1949 many German statutes directed forfeitures without re-
gard to the owner's guilt or danger to the public. A forfeiture of non-
dangerous property belonging to an innocent third party often re-
sulted under these statutes because of some illegal use made of the 
property by another. The Reich Supreme Court and the earlier com-
mentators sought to explain these forfeitures on various grounds. 
Sometimes the concept of preventive forfeiture was stretched to in-
owner's smuggling 600 cigarettes. Judgment of 13 October 1961, Oberlandesgericht 
[OLGI Hamm, in 1962 NJW 828. See Eser at 356; KUhn, Abgabenordnung § 414 at 508 
(8th ed. 1966) [hereafter KUhn, AOI (giving example of unconstitutional excess as 
forfeiting automobile for smuggling one bottle of cognac). 
In America, there once was a simple rule that there would be no forfeiture for a 
trivial infraction. Phile qui tam v. The Anna, 1 Dall. (1 U.S.) 197, 206 (C.P. Phila. 
County 1787). The rule's English counterpart dated back to the statute, 38 Edw. 3, c. B 
(1363). Neither was strictly a proportionality rule. Today ~he smallness of the quanti-
ty of illegal goods is irrelevant, even where the owner is innocent. See United States 
v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978). See also Note, supra n. 1 at 
775 n. 44. 
58. Dietrichs makes the point that it is not enough to say a vehicle used in illegal 
hunting may be validly forfeit. The forfeiture might not be excessive if the vehicle is 
a bicycle, but would be if the vehicle were a Mercedes. Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 35. 
59. See Eser at 356. 
60. StGB § 74b ~ 3. 
61. Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 36-38; Dreher § 74b at'374; Eser at 356 (noting develop-
ing consensus and SchrOder's change of attitude). 
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elude these third-party forfeitures.62 Other times it was said that 
the owner stood in a position of guarantor with respect to his prop-
erty: if the owner failed to prevent the illegal use of his property, it 
could justly be forfeit.63 Finally, a related theory held the property 
itself responsible for whatever illegal use was made of it.64 With the 
adoption of the Basic Law in 1949, these earlier forfeiture statutes 
became subject to the guilt principle and to the strengthened prop-
erty guarantees of Art. 14. Applying these principles, the Federal 
Supreme Court in 1951 rejected the old theories that had once sup-
ported the non-preventive third-party forfeitures.65 It held that "to 
permit the uninvolved property owner to be held liable for the guilt 
of the principal or of an accessory is . . . on grounds of justice and 
equity only justifiable, if the facts of the case contain a particular 
ground of justification for such a measure."66 The Court held how-
ever that it was not necessary that the third party be guilty of a 
crime. An appropriate legal justification was either a preventive 
measure or "if the uninvolved property owner could have recognized 
with the exercise of requisite and justly expected care, that the prin-
cipal perpetrator or an accessory would use or could have used the 
property in the commission of the [illegal) act .... "67 Thus arose 
the "punishment-like" third-party forfeiture, a criminal sanction im-
posed for a degree of blameworthiness, yet absent a crime by the 
owner. 
1. "Punishment-like" Forfeiture and the Property Guarantee 
"Punishment-like" forfeiture can avoid the constitutional prop-
erty guarantee because the misuse of property places it outside the 
terms of that guarantee.68 Exactly what is sufficient misuse to over-
come the property guarantee has been much discussed. That the 
property was used in a crime will not in itself suffice. As Eser notes, 
62. Judgment of 7 April 1933, 67 RGSt 215; see Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 
BGHSt 351, 353. 
63. Known as Garantenhajtung. See Eser at 78-80; Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 686. 
64. Judgment of 11 November 1935, 69 RGSt 385, 389; Judgment of 27 January 1928, 
62 RGSt 49, 52. Known as dingliche Hajtung for fremde Schuld. See Schlifer LK vor 
§ 40 margin no. 3. The United States Supreme Court in its most recent forfeiture de-
cision raised variations of all three of these theories to support American forfeiture 
law. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974). See text at 
n. 175 infra. Cf. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921). 
65. Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 BGHSt 351, 353. See Judgment of 10 November 
1949, OLG Koblenz in 1950 NJW 78. 
66. 1 BGHSt at 353-54. 
67. Id. See also Judgment of 25 April 1952, 2 BGHSt 311, 312. The Federal 
Supreme Court in its judgment of 9 October 1951 also considered a proper legal justi-
fication to be made out if "the property owner has had a benefit, the connection of 
which to the [illegal] act was recognizable for him." 1 BGHSt at 353. The draft pro-
posals of the new criminal code included such a benefit provision. Entwurj 1956 § 121 
cl. 3; Entwurj 1960 § 113 ~ 2 cl. 2(b); Entwurj 1962 § 113 ~ 2 cl. 2(b). The proposal was 
attacked as of dubious constitutionality, in part because of vagueness in defining the 
fault of the property owner, and was not enacted. See Eser at 232, 239-41. 
68. The exclusion is usually found in GG Art. 14 ~ 1 cl. 2. Eser at 224. See text of 
Art. 14 quoted in n. 45 supra. 
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to avoid the constitutional requirement merely by looking to the use 
of the property where the property owner is neither criminally 
blameworthy nor even reproachable must lead to "a complete sap-
ping of the property guarantee."69 Rather it is the fault of the owner 
that allows the property guarantee to be overcome.70 In this respect, 
the constitutional basis of the ''punishment-like'' forfeiture is similar 
to that of the punitive.71 The Federal Supreme Court has described 
the degree of blameworthiness required to permit a "punishment-
like" forfeiture as reproachable conduct (vorwerjbares Verhalten).72 
A general showing of bad character is not sufficient. The constitu-
tion requires a finding that the owner's blameworthy conduct con-
tributed directly to the illegal use of the property.73 It is therefore 
necessary that some specific act of the owner be singled out as re-
proachable.74 
The 1968 reform of the forfeiture provisions of the German crim-
inal code allows only a relatively narrow range of "punishment-like" 
forfeitures. "Punishment-like" forfeitures are possible only when 
the definition of a crime specifically refers to § 74a, which estab-
lishes the conditions for such forfeitures. That section permits or-
dering a "punishment-like" forfeiture only if the third-party owner: 
1. at least heedlessly (leichtjertig) has contributed to the 
thing or right having been the means or the object of the 
[illegal] act or its preparation, or 
2. has culpably (in verwerjlicher Weise) obtained the prop-
erty with knowledge of the circumstances which would 
have permitted the forfeiture.75 
By heedlessness the statute requires something greater than ordi-
nary negligence, approaching gross negligence.76 Thus, as enacted, a 
"punishment-like" third-party forfeiture is permissible only if the 
owner has acted with near-gross negligence or has reproachably ac-
quired the property with knowledge of a potential crime. Despite 
the relatively narrow scope of § 74a, Professors Baumann, Eser and 
69. Eser at 224. See also Stree, supra n. 41 at 107-08. Yet, in American law "lilt is 
the illegal use that is the material consideration,-it is that which works the forfei-
ture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental." J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant 
Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921). . 
70. Judgment of 16 June 1958, 27 BGHZ 382, 385. The avoidance of the property 
guarantee rests on a failure of the owner's responsibility. See Eser at 225. 
7l. See n. 45-47 and accompanying text supra. But it is not as satisfying as the 
actor's actual guilty partiCipation in crime found in the punitive forfeiture. See 
SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74a at 815. Jescheck says that the owner's relationship to 
the deed allows a "diminished guilt-reproach" (abgeschwlichten Schuldvorwurj). Jes-
check, Lehrbuch des Strajreches-Allgemeiner Teil 599 (2d ed. 1972). 
72. Judgment of 16 June 1958,27 BGHZ 382, 385. 
73. Judgment of 25 October 1963, 19 BGHSt 123, 126. 
74. The Federal Supreme Court held the constitutional requirement not satisfied 
by the failure of a secured creditor to check his debtor for a criminal record. 19 
BGHSt 123. 
75. StGB § 74a. 
76. Dreher § 74 at 377; Eser at 225; GOhler, OWiG § 23 at 148; ScMnke-SchrOder-
Eser § 74a at 815. 
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other commentators doubt whether "punishment-like" forfeiture 
conforms with the guilt principle, the property guarantee and other 
constitutional requirements.77 Baumann sees ''punishment-like'' 
forfeiture as "a type of secondary punishment of not-punishable 
third parties."78 
2. Other Constitutional Problems 
Critics begin, as Baumann does, with the proposition that the 
sanction is nothing other than a punishment. It cannot be a preven-
tive measure; that is precluded by the requirement of blameworthi-
ness. To the contrary, the Federal Supreme Court's own 
designation, "punishment-like," recognizes that the sanction is 
closer to punishment. Examination of the function and the goals of 
the "punishment-like" forfetture, the critics contend, shows that it is 
nothing other than punishment. "Punishment-like" forfeiture takes 
property for the blameworthiness of the owner as a quasi-partici-
pant in crime.79 Eser notes that the whole tenor of the 1968 reform 
provisions confirm the conclusion,. since they embody a mit im Spiel 
gewesen ("in on the crime") approach.80 Similarly, the goals of the 
"punishment-like" forfeiture are specific deterrence of the individ-
ual owner and general deterrence of the community at large, typical 
purposes of punishment.81 Also, the critics rightly find the argu-
ment unpersuasive that "punishment-like" forfeiture is not punish-
ment because the owner is not personally prosecuted.82 
If ''punishment-like'' forfeiture is seen as a punishment, it must 
meet all the constitutional and legal requirements of punishments 
generally. Foremost, "[a]n act can be punished only if it was an of-
fence against the law before the act was committed."83 The critics 
ask, where is the statute establishing the property owner's of-
77. Baumann, Strajrecht-Allgemeiner Teil 731 (5th ed. 1968); Eser at 238-41. 
78. Id. at 731. . 
79. Id. at 731; Eser at 224-32 (particularly at 230); Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 686-90; 
GOhler, OWiG at 136; Zeidler, "Strafrechtliche Einziehung und Art. 14 GG," 1954 NJW 
1148, 1149 [hereafter Zeidler, 1954 NJW). 
80. Eser at 225. 
81. Id. at 230; Jescheck, supra n. 71 at 597. Eser contends that recognition of the 
deterrent purpose of the "punishment-like" forfeiture is general. Eser at 230 n. 42. 
82. Eser calls the argument nothing more than "pure formalism," adoption of the 
View "that can not be, which may not be." Eser at 231. Yet, that seemed to be the 
view of the Federal Supreme Court in one of its first decisions in the area (creating 
the "punishment-like" claSSification). Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 BGHSt 351, 353. 
Gilsdorf attacks the suggestion of the creation of a sui generis class of "punishment-
like" forfeitures as a compromise between expediency and constitutional principles. 
Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 689. The United States Supreme Court has adopted an argument 
similar to that assailed by Eser. "It is the property which is proceeded against, and 
... held guilty . . . . In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is 
proceeded against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is not part of the punish-
ment for the criminal offense." Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 
282 U.S. 577, 581 (1930). 
83. GG Art. 103 ~ 2, translation, supra n. 45 at 56. 
" 
/ 
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fense?84 Assuming the offense can be seen as established through 
reading the general forfeiture section of the new code in combina-
tion with the specific crime in which the property was used, the of-
fense thus established must still be defined with specificity.85 Eser 
suggests that offenses so created by the new code may be void for 
vagueness.86 In another direction, § 74a creates the likelihood of 
punishment in the absence of criminal intent, which raises further 
questions, viz. the guilt principle.87 While the proportionality re-
quirement applicable to punitive forfeitures is as fully applicable to 
''punishment-like'' third-party forfeiture, there is no provision to as-
sure that the (only) "quasi-guilty" owner is treated less severely 
than the criminally guilty principal or accessory whose act gave rise 
to the forfeiture.B8 Absent such a provision, it is probable that an 
owner will be punished by the forfeiture of property worth consider-
ably more than the ·ftne assessed against the criminal perpetrator. 
More generally, the critics charge that "punishment-like" forfeiture 
never really clearly establishes what the conduct is that is worthy of 
condemnation.89 The property owner has committed no crime. Eser 
charges that the true motive of "punishment-like" forfeiture is to 
punish those suspected of complicity. Punishment for suspicion, he 
says, has no place in a constitutional state.90 
Thus the critics argue that "punishment-like" forfeiture should 
be dropped as contrary to constitutional principles.91 Eser notes 
that in any case "punishment-like" forfeiture serves little purpose. 
If the owner is in fact criminally culpable he will be punishable as 
an accessory and the property may thus be subject to forfeiture. In 
other cases, the property will be subject to forfeiture as a preventive 
measure.92 The liberal professors who prepared the alternative 
draft criminal code would have solved the constitutional problems 
by getting rid of all except purely preventive forfeitures.93 
84. Eser at 232; Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 689; Zeidler, 1954 NJW at 1149. For a contrary 
argument, see Stree, supra n. 41 at 112-14. 
85. Eser at 232; Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 689, 691. 
86. Eser at 233-34. One of the three proposed "punishment-like" forfeitures was 
dropped from the enacted code. See n. 67 supra. 
87. Eser at 225-26, 234. 
88. Eser at 237-38; see n. 49-61 and accompanying text supra. 
89. See Eser at 236-37. 
90. Eser at 234-35. 
91. Eser at 238-41; Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 685, 689, 691. Jescheck rejects these criti-
cisms. See Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts-Allgemeiner Teil 644 n.17 (3d ed. 
1978). 
92. Eser at 239-41. 
93. Baumann et aI., Alternativ-Entwuif eines Strajgesetzbuches-Allgemeiner Teil 
§ 88 at 161 (1966). A translation of the alternative draft has recently been published. 
Darby, Alternative Draft oj a Penal Code jor the Federal Republic oj Germany (Am. 
Series of Foreign Penal Codes vol. 21, 1977). 
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C. Preventive Forfeiture 
1. The Property Guarantee 
Forfeiture of property as a preventive measure to protect soci-
ety from a specific danger has been accepted with near unanimity in 
German law as a legitimate instrument of the legal order and as 
consistent with constitutional principles.94 Perhaps for that reason 
it was not until the middle 1960s that it came under scrutiny for con-
formity with the Basic Law. The general acceptance of some form of 
preventive forfeiture has continued unassailed, though with some 
dispute as to the exact theoretical basis of the sanction.95 Neverthe-
less, discussion of preventive forfeiture has not centered on its per-
missibility. Instead, most commentary has been directed toward the 
necessary constitutional limitations imposed by the property guar-
anty of Art. 14. 
In a decision of 16 July 1965, the Federal Supreme Court stated 
general principles derived from Art. 14 limiting preventive forfeiture. 
Each individual case must be meticulously scrutinized for 
whether the encroachment to meet the danger is actually 
appropriate (geeignet) and whether it is required (erforder-
lich). Only for necessary measures is there a legal justifica-
tion for the state to seize private property . .. IT) he 
perpetrator's unlawful conduct ... alone is not yet able to 
justify the forfeiture. Rather, there must also be the danger 
of further disruptions of the lawful order through or with 
the forfeited object. Finally, the measure must also be in ac-
cord with the general constitutional principle of proportion-
ality of means.96 
These three related principles-necessity (Erforderlichkeit), appro-
priateness (Geeignetheit) and proportionality (Verh(litnism(lS-
sigkeit)-are not always kept distinct in the discussion of 
preventive forfeitures.97 All three are derived from the more general 
constitutional prohibition of excessive measures (Ubermass-
verbot).98 How German jurists have utilized these principles is of 
particular interest to the United States since American forfeitures 
have generally been upheld on the ground of their asserted role as 
preventive and regulatory measures. 
It is the need of the community to protect itself from a particu-
lar danger that allows the German state to overcome the constitu-
tional guarantee and forfeit its citizens' property. If there is in fact 
94. Eser at 118-20, 249-52. 
95. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 47-54; Eser at 249-52. Even the liberal professors' 
alternative draft code allowed purely preventive forfeitures. Baumann et aI., supra n. 
93, § 88 at 160-61. 
96. 20 BGHSt 253, 255-56 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
97. For example, the drafters of the new code didn't keep the three ideas sepa-
rate. StGB § 74b ~ 2 which deals with all three is simply headed "Principle of Propor-
tionality." 
98. Eser at 195-97,268-69; Lerche, {Jbermass und Verjassungsrecht 19-23 (1961). 
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no need for such protection, there can be no justification for a pre-
ventive forfeiture.99 The earlier law of the Federal Republic already 
recognized that a preventive forfeiture could be upheld only if a real 
danger to the community existed.1°o But under the pre-1968 law the 
judge was restricted in the range of actions he could take. Once he 
determined there was a real danger to the community he could only 
order a complete forfeiture or none at all; there was no middle way. 
To order the forfeiture would often be a greater response than nec-
essary to protect the public, while to deny forfeiture would take in-
sufficient account of the danger to the community. With the greater 
emphasis in the legal discussion of the 1960s upon the need for such 
a measure as a prerequisite to overcome the property guarantee, the 
constitutional position of such forfeitures became doubtful. Com-
plete forfeiture could not be justified if a lesser measure would meet 
the public's need for protection.10l Accordingly, first the liberal 
professors' alternative draft proposal,102 and eventually the 1968 re-
form,103 undertook a radical departure in preventive forfeiture law. 
The reform mandates a more accurate determination of the need for 
protection and enables the judge to meet the danger with a lesser 
sanction than complete forfeiture of the property. 
The 1968 reform act takes the approach that the actual sanction 
ordered with respect to the property should correspond as exactly 
as possible to the public danger. Intrusion into the area of constitu-
tionally protected rights will thereby be strictly limited to the mini-
mum measure actually necessary to protect the public. This 
determination is to be made by the trial court. § 74b of the new code 
provides: 
(2) In the cases of §§ 74 and 74a [the general forfeiture 
provisions I the court shall order that the forfeiture remain 
reserved, and shall find a less drastic measure, if the pur-
pose of the forfeiture can thereby be accomplished. As al-
ternatives may be considered an order 
1. to make the property unusable, 
2. to remove certain fixtures or marks or otherwise al-
ter the property, or 
3. to control the property in a certain way. 
If the order is complied with, the reservation of the for-
feiture will be at an end; otherwise the court shall at last or-
der forfeiture. 
(3) If the forfeiture is not mandatory, it can be limited 
99. Judgment of 16 July 1965, 20 BGHSt 253, 255·56 (quoted in pertinent part, text 
at n. 96 supra); Judgment of 16 June 1958, 27 BGHZ 382, 387-88; Eser at 249·52; Gil-
sdorf, 1958 JZ at 644; Jescheck, supra n. 71 at 600; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74 at 812; 
Stree, supra n. 41 at 109-10. 
100. SchOnke-Schroder § 40 at 186 (12th ed.); Zeidler, 1954 NJW at 1149. 
101. Judgment of 6 November 1969, OLG Karlsruhe in 1970 NJW 394, 396; see Die-
trichs, supra n. 27 at 54; Eser at 269; Stree, supra n. 41 at 110-11. 
102. Baumann et a1., supra n. 93 at § 88 ~ 2 at 160, 162. See Eser at 269-70. 
103. StGB § 74b ~~ 2, 3 (quoted in text at n. 104 infra). 
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to a part of the property.t04 
Complete forfeiture of property is thus the ultimate sanction to pre-
vent danger to the public. Before resorting to it, the trial court is to 
consider lesser measures and to prefer those lesser measures that 
would be eifective.t05 For example, illegally obtained drugs need 
only be returned to the pharmacist, not forfeited, in order to protect 
the public.t06 The public is protected from unlicensed drivers when 
the car is taken into custody until such time as the driver gets a li-
cense; no forfeiture is necessary.107 In the case of the driver who 
cannot be allowed to drive at all, the danger to the public is averted 
when the driver has disposed of the car, though keeping the pro-
ceeds for himself. loa 
To be constitutional, a preventive forfeiture must not only be 
necessary to protect the community, it must also be appropriate and 
proportiona1.109 A forfeiture or lesser similar preventive sanction is 
appropriate only if it will in fact serve to protect the legal interest 
for which it is supposedly employed.llo Here it is the responsibility 
of the trial judge to examine the legal interest to be protected and 
the danger to that interest. Similarly, a forfeiture must be consid-
ered inappropriate if it is wholly inadequate to achieve the sup-
posed goal of protection. Thus the forfeiture of an everyday item of 
modest value usually cannot be justified as a preventive measure.lll 
Finally, the preventive measure, like the punitive, must be prop or-
104. StGB § 74b ~~ 2, 3. 
105. See generally Dreher § 74b at 379·80; Eser at 270-74; Gohler, OWiG § 24 at 154-
57; Schafer LK § 40b margin nos. 10-16; Schonke-SchrOder-Eser § 74b at 817-19. 
106. Judgment of 30 July 1974, Bayerisches OLG in 1974 NJW 2060. There is some 
precedent for such a course in American law. See United States v. 76,552 Pounds of 
Frog Legs, 423 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (allowing owner an opportunity to 
reprocess frog legs to bring product into conformity with federal standards). 
107. See Judgment of 3 April 1974, Landgericht [LG) Karlsruhe in 1974 NJW 1257. 
108. See Judgment of 5 November 1973, OLG Braunschweig in 1974 Monatsschrift 
.tar Deutsches Recht [MDR) 594. The mere promise of the owner not to use the prop-
erty illegally is probably not sufficient. SchOnke-Schroder-Eser § 74b at 819; contra 
Judgment of 6 November 1969, OLG Karlsruhe in 1970 NJW 394, 396. 
109. Judgment of 16 July 1965,20 BGHSt 253, 255-56 (quoted in pertinent part, text 
at n. 96 supra). The appropriateness requirement is sometimes spoken of as the "goal 
suitability" (Zwecktauglichkeit) criterion. Eser at 274. 
110. Eser at 274-77; SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 486 (12th ed.). Thus the forfeiture of 
uncustomed goods is appropriate as a preventive measure to assure the government 
its revenues and to protect the public from black market goods only so long as the 
owner is unavailable or unwilling to pay the duty and otherwise comply with regula-
tions. If the owner is willing to pay the duty and comply with regulations, a forfeiture 
of the goods is inappropriate as a preventive measure and can only be justified as 
punishment. Eser at 275. Forfeitures that would be inappropriate in Germany are 
permiSSible in the U.S. See United States v. Four Pinball Machines, 429 F. Supp. 1002 
(D. Ha. 1977) (ordering forfeiture of gaming machines despite owner's willingness to 
pay the use tax owing from the lessee of the devices); Dickey, "Survivals from More 
Primitive Times: Customs Forfeitures in the Modern Commercial Setting," 7 Law & 
Policy in Int. Bus. 691 (1975). 
111. Judgment of 16 July 1965, 20 BGHSt 253, 256 (holding a typewriter could not 
be forfeit as a preventive measure). Cf. Eser at 276-77. 
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tionate.U2 If the danger to the community, though real, is slight, and 
the commercial value of the property great, the judge must deny the 
forfeiture.1l3 In the reform act of 1968, to the extent that appropri-
ateness and proportionality are dealt with by statute, they fall under 
the provisions of § 74b. 
2. What Gives Rise to a Preventive Forfeiture? 
Property dangerous to the community and subject to preventive 
forfeiture is of two types, distinguished by whether the danger ex-
ists in the abstrakt or is only relativ.1l4 Certain property is by its 
nature and construction dangerous to the community. Military ex-
plosives, toxins and poisoned foods are dangerous in the abstract. 
In contrast, property which is ordinarily safe can become dangerous 
in certain circumstances. A hunting rifle is safe if owned by a re-
sponsible citizen, but is relatively dangerous in the hands of a mad-
man. In the past, the abstract category of property dangerous 
regardless of circumstances has been the core of preventive forfei-
ture law; some commentators have suggested, without general ac-
ceptance, that preventive forfeitures should be limited to that 
category.U5 Professor Eser would not so limit preventive forfeiture, 
but would abolish the distinction between abstract and relative dan-
gers. He correctly observes that very few objects can be said to be 
absolutely dangerous.u6 Instead of maintaining a strict distinction 
between abstract and relative, Eser would have courts look at all the 
circumstances, including the nature and construction of the prop-
erty, the objective facts of the situation, and the personality of the 
criminal actor, if the actor is the owner of the property. The appro-
priate sanction to meet the danger so determined would then be or-
dered.1l7 
The 1968 reform act follows past interpretations of what consti-
tutes a danger giving rise to a preventive forfeiture. § 74 provides 
that property may be forfeit if "by its nature and under the circum-
stances it endangers the general public or the danger exists that it 
will serve in the commission of further illegal acts."IlB The primary 
clause, that of property dangerous "by its nature and under the cir-
cumstances" encompasses both the abstract and the relative catego-
112. Judgment of 16 July 1965, 20 BGHSt 253, 256. 
113. Gohler, OWiG § 22 at 145; SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 486 (12th ed.). 
114. Judgment of 15 December 1970, OLG Oldenburg in 1971 NJW 769, 770; 
Creifelds, "Die strafrechtliche Einziehung gegen den 'Dritteigentumer'," 1955 Juris-
tische Rundschau [JR) 403, 404-07 [hereafter Creifelds, 1955 JR); Eser at 258-60; 
Gohler, OWiG § 22 at 145; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74 at 812. Cf. Dreher § 74 at 374. 
115. See e.g., Stree, supra n. 41 at 11-12. See also, Eser at 259-61. Cf. U.S. v. One 
1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974). 
116. Eser at 259-60. For example, some explosives, though dangerous in public 
trade, have their place in the hands of a responsible contractor. Forged postage 
stamps present no danger in the reference collection of an honest philatelist or state 
philatelic library. 
117. Eser at 262-64. 
118. StGB § 74 ~ 2 cl. 2. 
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ries.119 The possibility envisioned in the secondary clause was 
recognized well before the 1968 reform act and requires further elab-
oration.120 Forfeiting property where danger exists of further illegal 
use potentially gives preventive forfeiture a very broad sweep. How-
ever, the statute is not to be so widely read.121 Emphasis must be 
placed on the danger of actual further illegal use. Before property 
ordinarily of legal use may be forfeit on account of a risk of further 
illegal use, the trial judge must find "tangible criteria" (konkrete 
Anhaltspunkte) which in their "outline" show the danger to be "al-
ready fairly clearly definable."122 A mere suspicion of some uncer-
tain future criminal activity with the property is not sufficient.123 
Eser has provided a good general statement of the widest permissi-
ble extent of preventive forfeiture: 
Grounds for a preventive forfeiture of property involved in 
the crime are made out, if on the basis of specified estab-
lished facts and upon assessment of all the circumstances of 
the individual case, . . . the strong probability exists that 
the property is injuring legally protected interests or will 
serve in the commission of unlawful acts.124 
D. Compensation 
Besides limiting the circumstances in which forfeiture may be 
ordered, the 1968 reform act took further steps to establish a secure 
constitutional foundation when forfeiture is actually ordered. The 
reform safeguards third parties either by continuing their rights in 
the property after forfeiture or by giving them compensation. § 74e 
of the 1975 Code includes the general rule that third-party rights 
shall continue notwithstanding the forfeiture,125 with two important 
exceptions. If the forfeiture is a preventive measure to protect the 
public, the court must order the extinction of all rights in the prop-
erty126 though innocent third parties will still have a claim to com-
pensation.l27 Moreover, the court may order the extinction of the 
rights of a third party who is sufficiently blameworthy to meet the 
requirements of a "punishment-like" forfeiture.128 In the event the 
court orders a forfeiture, unaware of the rights of third parties or 
without a sufficient legal foundation to extinguish third-party rights, 
119. GOhler, OWiG § 22 at 145; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74 at 812. 
120. See Creifelds, 1955 JR at 404-07. 
121. Although if the section were so widely read, it would still be subject to the 
constitutional prohibition of excessive means and the statutory formulation of that 
prohibition in StGB § 74b. See Judgment of 15 December 1970, OLG Oldenburg in 
1971 NJW 769. 
122. SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74 at 812-13. 
123. Id. Schafer LK § 40 margin no. 49. 
124. Eser at 268. 
125, StGB § 74e ~ 2. Cf. OWiG § 26 ~ 2. Under the 1871 Criminal Code, third party 
rights were extinguished. SchOnke-Schroder § 40 at 191 (12th ed.). 
126. StGB § 74e ~ 2. Cf. OWiG § 26 ~ 2. 
127. StGB § 74f. Cf. OWiG § 24. 
128. StGB § 74e ~ 2. Cf. OWiG § 26 ~ 2. 
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§ 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted as a part of the 
1968 reform, gives the third party an action to recover his property 
or vindicate his rightS.129 
§ 74f of the Criminal Code of 1975 directs that innocent third 
parties be reimbursed by the state when their property or rights are 
taken or otherwise diminished in value in consequence of forfeiture 
proceedings.130 Compensation is to be at the full commercial value 
of the taking or diminution.13l Principals and accessories to the 
crime have no claim to compensation. l32 Their misuse of property 
ends the constitutional right to compensation even with preventive 
forfeitures. l33 Nor is the owner who has so misbehaved as to merit a 
"punishment-like" forfeiture entitled to reimbursement.l34 
The compensation requirement is essential to a fair and effec-
tive system of preventive forfeiture. Without it the statutory 
scheme would probably have to choose between protecting the inno-
cent property owner or the general public. For example, permitting 
forfeiture only if the owner is culpable would protect innocent own-
ers but would leave the public exposed to dangerous property still 
in private possession. Allowing forfeiture whenever there is a sub-
stantial danger would protect the public, but at the expense of the 
innocent owner. The German solution of allowing forfeiture when 
there is a substantial danger to the public but requiring compensa-
129. StPO § 439. Under § 439 the third party owner must seek the return of the 
property or the vindication of his right within one month of learning of the forfeiture 
and in no event later than two years after the effective date of the forfeiture order. 
Should the third party owner delay past those time limits, he can no longer reclaim 
the property or right, but may still secure compensation for the taking suffered. See 
Kleinknecht, StPO § 439 at 904-06; SchOnke-Schroder-Eser § 74e at 826. Cf. OWiG § 87 
~ 4. 
130. StGB § 74f ~ 1. Cf. OWiG § 24 ~ I. 
131. Dreher § 74f at 391; Gohler, OWiG § 28 at 174-75; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74f 
at 829. 
132. StGB § 74f ~ 1. Cf. OWiG § 28 ~ 1. 
133. Gohler, OWiG § 28 at 171. The preventive forfeiture can thus take on certain 
attributes of punishment, since in some cases the guilty owner will suffer the addi-
tional "penalty" of not receiving compensation where the innocent third party will. 
German commentators have not discussed this issue. But see Judgment of 5 Novem-
ber 1973, OLG Braunschweig in 1974 MDR 594 (recognizing the issue). This discrep-
ancy will not be apparent in the case of abstractly dangerous property, since such 
property will be deemed without commercial value and neither the principal nor the 
third party will be compensated. Where the discrepancy will be evident is in the case 
of relatively dangerous property, particularly where the property is taken on account 
of the danger of further illegal use. But here the guilty principal will be protected to 
a certain extent by the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Moreover, Pro-
fessor Eser suggests the trial judge should take this forfeiture into account in decid-
ing the main sentence. Telephone interview with Professor Albin Eser (19 June 
1977). See Dreher § 74b at 379. See also n. 61 and accompanying text supra. 
134. StGB § 74f ~ 3. Cf. OWiG § 28 ~ 2. Reimbursement is also not required if the 
property is subject to an uncompensated taking under some other proviSion of law. 
§ 74f does give the guilty owner a protection not required by the Basic Law: if the 
forfeiture will work an unjust hardship, the owner may be compensated. StGB § 74f ~ 
3. Cf. OWiG § 28 ~ 3. See Eser at 374-77. 
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tion to the innocent owner effectively balances the public and pri-
vate interests. 
E. Special Forms oj Ownership 
German law has ordinarily required that forfeiture as punish-
ment is permissible only when the principal or an accessory owns 
the property at the time of the order.135 This requirement was 
raised to constitutional rank by the Federal Supreme Court inter-
preting the guilt principle in the early 1950s. One consequence is 
that a punitive forfeiture is not permissible if the property is jointly 
owned and only some of the owners are guilty of the crime.136 In 
that case a forfeiture is permissible only on other grounds, either as 
a "punishment-like" or preventive forfeiture. 
The Federal Supreme Court extended the requirement of com-
plicity of all owners to include all forms of ownership, even those 
that are purely formal. Thus even in the case of contingent forms of 
ownership, such as rights held as a secured creditor or as a condi-
tional seller, it is necessary to establish either complicity, sufficient 
guilt for a "punishment-like" forfeiture or preventive grounds.137 
The Court soon recognized the undesirability of allowing the crimi-
nal to escape a punitive forfeiture merely because he had failed to 
make the final installment payment. Therefore the Federal 
Supreme Court held that a forfeiture might be declared if the state 
agreed beforehand to assume all the obligations of the owner-crimi-
nal to the security holder or conditional seller.138 
A number of commentators have argued that the 1968 reform act 
has changed the situation with respect to the special forms of own-
ership just discussed. Especially Eser has argued that the new 
broad-reaching compensation provisions allow the courts to look 
only to commercial ownership of the property and to limit purely 
formal owners to their claim for compensation.139 The Federal 
Supreme Court however has explicitly rejected Eser's position and 
adhered to its position under the old code.140 But the Court has 
reached a basically similar result by an imaginative reading of the 
135. StGB § 40 (1953). Schafer LK § 40 margin no. 28 (GeMren bedeutet: AI-
leineigenttlmer sein.) (emphasis in original). SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 188-89 (12th 
ed.). One consequence of the requirement that the property belong to the perpetra-
tor was that property of a juristic person could not be forfeit, even though the princi-
pal was acting as a representative of the corporate entity. Schwarz-Dreher § 40 at 124. 
This result was overcome by a special provision of the new code. StGB § 75. 
136. Judgment of 18 October 1951, 2 BGHSt 337; Judgment of 25 April 1952, 2 
BGHSt 311. 
137. Judgment of 25 April 1952, 2 BGHSt 311. 
138. Judgment of 21 June 1955, 8 BGHSt 70. 
139. Eser, "Zum Eigentumsbegriff im Einziehungsrecht," 1972 JZ 146-49. See also 
Esser, "Anmerkung" [to BGH Judgment of 24 August 19721, 1973 JZ 171-73; Meyer, 
"Anmerkung" [to BGH Judgment of 24 August 19721, 1973 JR 338; SchOnke-SchrOder-
Eser § 74 at 811; SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 189 (12th ed.). 
140. Judgment of 24 August 1972, 25 BGHSt 10; Judgment of 28 September 1971, 24 
BGHSt 222. 
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reform act. Before 1968 only objects could be forfeit, not rights,141 
Now, under the 1968 act, rights too may be forfeit if illegally used or 
obtained.142 The Federal Supreme Court interpreted this provision 
to allow the state to forfeit whatever right the security giver or con-
ditional buyer has in the property. The Court adopted the theory 
that the owner's misuse of the object effected a misuse of his rights 
in the object as well.143 Eser has criticized this approach as unnec-
essarily complicated and as possibly leading to future problems. l44 
F. Profits of Crime 
In addition to the forfeiture of property created by or used in 
crime, German law employs the related sanction of deprivation of 
profits of crime. Depriving the wrongdoer of the profits of his illegal 
activity is not thought to be punishment in the usual case.145 Nor is 
it considered a preventive measure. Instead it is seen as a measure 
separate and distinct from the punitive and preventive forfeitures 
discussed above. The 1975 criminal code treats deprivation of the 
profits of crime separately from the forfeiture of the instruments 
and products of crime. The two sanctions are dealt with in different 
code sections and under different names.146 In discussing the for-
mer sanction, commentators have pointed out the reparative effect 
of taking away the profits of crime. The deprivation effects a resto-
ration of the legal order by denying the illegitimate receiver the un-
lawfully obtained enrichment.147 Ordinarily, only the criminal will 
be subject to deprivation. In appropriate circumstances however, 
third parties may lose property as profits of crime. Third parties can 
be subject to deprivation only if the criminal acted illegally on be-
half of the third party or if the third party culpably accepted the 
profit with knowledge of the circumstances.148 
THE PROCEDURE FOR IMpOSING FORFEITURE 
For nearly a century American law regarded the separate in rem 
action as the only proper procedural form in which to declare a for-
feiture of property. Forfeiture in a criminal prosecution was consid-
141. SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 188 (12th ed.); Schwarz-Dreher § 40 at 123-24. 
142. GOhler, OWiG § 22 at 140; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 74 at 807. 
143. Judgment of 24 August 1972, 25 BGHSt 10; accord Judgment of 19 October 
1973, OLG Karlsruhe in 1974 MDR 154. 
144. Eser, "Anmerkung," 1973 JZ 171-73. See also Schafer LK § 40 margin nos. 29-
32. 
145. Dreher § 73 at 361-62; Lackner § 73 at 335; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser at 792. 
146. Deprivation (Veifall) is dealt with in StGB §§ 73-73d; forfeiture (Einziehung), 
both punitive and preventive, is dealt with in StGB §§ 74-75. StGB §§ 76-76a are com-
mon to both sanctions. 
147. Dreher § 73 at 361; Lackner § 73 at 334. Lackner considers deprivation a meas-
ure ''for reparation of violated law" (zur Wiederherstellung des verletzten Rechts). Id. 
at 335. Eser calls it a "quasi conditional equalization (or compensation) (Ausgleich) 
measure." Schonke-Schroder-Eser § 73 at 792. 
148. StGB § 73 ~~ (3) & (4). See Dreher § 73 at 365-66; SchOnke-Schroder-Eser § 73 
at 798-800. 
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ered inappropriate.149 In contrast, German law has considered 
forfeiture proceedings independent of the prosecution of the perpe-
trator to be the exceptional method of procedure. § 40 of the Crimi-
nal Code of 1871 specifically provided that "[ t] he forfeiture order 
must be pronounced in the sentence."150 Nevertheless, § 42 recog-
nized exceptional circumstances in which an independent suit for 
forfeiture might be brought. "If. . . no specific person can be prose-
cuted or convicted, the measures [prescribed in § 40] may be im-
posed independently."151 When a specific person can be prosecuted, 
both under the old law and the new, the forfeiture was and is to be 
imposed in that prosecution. 
A. Criminal Prosecution 
If the owner of the property is not subject to prosecution, the 
forfeiture is to be imposed in prosecution of the principal or acces-
sory whose acts gave rise to the circumstances allowing a forfei-
ture.152 Under the law in effect until 1968, the third-party owner had 
no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal defendant to 
protect his property. This practice was challenged in the course of 
reconsidering forfeiture law in light of the Basic Law. Both the Fed-
eral Supreme Court and a number of commentators expressed 
doubt that such third-party forfeitures conformed with the constitu-
tional requirement that "[i]n the courts everyone shall be entitled 
to a hearing in accordance with law."153 Consequently in amending 
the substantive law of forfeiture, the drafters of the 1968 reform 
amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to give a third-party own-
er his constitutional right to be heard.154 Under the fairly elaborate 
provisions enacted, the property owner is given the right of a crimi-
nal defendant with certain exceptions.155 In case the owner does not 
intervene in the perpetrator's trial and the trial court has reason to 
believe such an owner exists, the court is required to investigate.156 
Finally, if the third party still does not have the opportunity to be 
heard, he is given an opportunity to bring a suit to recover his prop-
erty.157 
B. Independent Proceeding 
Though the 1968 reform act made a number of changes in the 
149. See n. 3-5 and accompanying text supra. 
150. StGB § 40 ~ 2 (1953). 
151. StGB § 42 (1953). 
152. SchOnke-Schroder-Eser § 74 at 814; SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 191 (12th ed.); 
Schwarz-Dreher § 40 at 126-27. 
153. GG Art. 103 ~ I, translation, supra n. 45 at 56. Judgment of 29 October 1963, 19 
BGHSt 123; Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 91-95; Schonke-SchrOder § 40 at 192 (12th ed.). 
154. StPO §§ 431-39. See Kleinknecht, StPO at 18, 887. 
155. Bode, "Das neue Recht der Einziehung im Strafrecht nach dem EGOWiG," 
1969 NJW 1052, 1055; Kleinknecht, StPO § 433 at 896. 
156. StPO § 432 ~ ll. 
157. StPO § 439. See n. 129 supra. 
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procedure for imposing forfeiture as part of the criminal prosecu-
tion, it did not greatly change the law of the somewhat exceptional 
independent forfeiture proceeding. For the most part the new provi-
sions codify judicial and scholarly interpretation of § 42 of the Crimi-
nal Code of 1871. All three varieties of forfeiture-punitive, 
"punishment-like," and preventive-may on some occasions be im-
posed in separate proceedings.15S Use of the independent proceed-
ing does not change the nature of the forfeiture so imposed.159 In 
fact, the nature of the forfeiture significantly affects the availability 
of the independent proceeding; non-preventive forfeitures may be 
imposed in independent proceedings in a much narrower range of 
circumstances than preventive ones. 
A non-preventive forfeiture may be imposed in an independent 
proceeding only when "on factual grounds no specific person can be 
prosecuted or convicted."160 Only such factual obstacles as make 
prosecution impossible without affecting the material punishability 
of the crime qualify.161 Thus an independent forfeiture proceeding 
may be maintained if the perpetrator has fled the jurisdiction or 
cannot be discovered,162 but not when the perpetrator-owner has 
died, for then there could no longer be a prosecution.163 Nor can an 
independent proceeding for a punitive forfeiture be maintained 
when the prosecution has been abandoned or has failed. 164 In gen-
eral, the legal impossibility of prosecution does not allow an in-
dependent proceeding for a punitive forfeiture.165 If however the 
state attorney decides' to forego the criminal prosecution, then by 
explicit statutory provision, an independent proceeding may be 
brought.166 Assuming the prerequisites for an independent punitive 
forfeiture proceeding are met, the state must also prove every other 
material element of the crime. Thus the state cannot obtain a forfei-
158. See generally Gohler, OWiG § 27 at 167·70; SchOnke·Schroder-Eser § 76a at 
834-36. 
159. SchOnke-SchrOder § 42 at 194 (12th ed.). The use of the independent proceed-
ing does reduce the vote required for the verdict to a simple majority (from either an 
absolute majority or two-thirds). Kleinknecht, StPO § 440 at 908. 
160. StGB § 76a ~ 1. 
161. GOhler, OWiG § 27 at 168; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 769. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. The Reich Supreme Court allowed the forfeiture in spite of the actor's 
death. Schonke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 834. See KUhn, AO § 414 at 509. 
164. Judgment of 31 March 1954, 6 BGHSt 62. Formerly, a preventive forfeiture 
was also barred by abandonment or failure of the prosecution. KUhn, AO § 414 at 509; 
Schonke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 835. StGB § 78 ~ 1 now makes such a preventive for-
feiture possible. Judgment of 14 February 1975, OLG Stuttgart in 1975 MDR 681. A 
similar distinction has been made in American law: a failure in prosecution bars a 
subsequent punitive forfeiture, but not a remedial one. Coffey v. United States, 116 
U.S. 436 (1886); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897). See also One Lot Emerald 
Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Note supra n. 1 at 789-90. 
165. GOhler, OWiG § 27 at 168-69; see Judgment of 31 March 1954, 6 BGHSt 62. 
166. StGB § 76a ~ 3. In American law it was once held unconstitutional to impose 
a punitive forfeiture in a separate proceeding. Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135 
(C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (no. 5,764); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) I, 36-44 (1851); Hib-
berd v. People, 4 Mich. 125 (1856). See Note, supra n. 1 at 784-87. 
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ture for an attempt not punishable in the criminallaw.167 Where the 
state brings an independent forfeiture proceeding because it has 
been unable to discover the perpetrator of the crime, it must still 
prove that some unknown person did fulfill all the elements of the 
crime.168 
A preventive forfeiture may be sought in an independent pro-
ceeding whenever a personal prosecution is impossible, whether on 
factual or legal grounds.169 Thus a preventive forfeiture is not pre-
cluded by a statute of limitations or by an amnesty.170 It is neces-
sary to prove all the elements required for a preventive forfeiture in 
a personal prosecution.l71 
SOME REMARKS ON AMERICAN LAW 
As noted at the outset of this comment, American courts have 
avoided a constitutional analysis of forfeiture law comparable to 
that undertaken in Germany, by reliance on a legal fiction of guilty 
property and supposed historical traditions of our law. Forfeiture 
has been treated by American courts as a unique form of sanction, 
completely apart from the general scheme of sanctions. Since forfei-
ture affects title to property, courts have held it to be necessarily in 
rem. If in rem, we are told it is necessarily civil in form and not pu-
nitive in effect. When the constitutionality of forfeiture has been 
challenged, our courts have invariably fallen back on the three posi-
tions of history, legal fiction and the supposed in rem nature of for-
feiture.172 Yet, were these the only bases for constitutionality, our 
courts would long ago have abolished forfeiture altogether. While 
history may create a presumption of constitutionality, past practice 
alone will never validate law.173 Legal fiction and procedural charac-
terization cannot even raise a presumption. But, as we have seen in 
examining the German law, there are a number of valid reasons to 
support forfeiture. Indeed, American courts in upholding our law 
have recognized the very same rationales relied upon in Germany. 
Unfortunately our courts have only incidentally referred to these ra-
tionales and have focused instead upon the illusory rationales of 
history, legal fiction, and procedural form. There is no better exam-
ple than the 1974 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding a 
Puerto Rican forfeiture statute, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
167. Eser at 53; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 834. 
168. GOhler, OWiG § 27 at 168. Gilsdorf argues against allowing punitive forfeit-
ures where the actor is unknown as contrary to a personal-guilt-oriented law of pun-
ishment. Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 688. . 
169. StGB § 76a ~ 2. 
170. GOhler, OWiG § 27 at 168; SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 835. 
171. SchOnke-SchrOder-Eser § 76a at 835. 
172. See e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) 
[noted in 60 Cornell L. Rev. 467 (1975)]. 
173. See Justice Holmes' remarks in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 
(1922) and Justice Story's comments in 1 Am. Jurist 1, 2 (1829). 
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Leasing CO.174 After a six-page discourse on the history of forfei-
ture, the Court in a single paragraph of three sentences explains 
what must be the true basis of American forfeiture law: 
Plainly [such 1 forfeiture statutes further the punitive 
and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to 
uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of 
other forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents. For-
feitures of conveyances that have been used-and may be 
used again-in violation of the narcotics laws fosters the 
purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both 
by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by 
imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal be-
havior unprofitable. To the extent that such forfeiture provi-
sions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors 
who are innocent of any wrong doing, confiscation may have 
the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater 
care in transferring possession of their property.175 
As we have seen in German law, almost anyone of these arguments 
might support a particular forfeiture in a specific situation. The fiaw 
in the Supreme Court's analysis is that the Court raises these argu-
ments briefly to support all forfeitures without ever showing how 
any single argument supports the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo. The 
Court does not even attempt to place this particular forfeiture 
within the general scheme of sanctions, as a punishment or as some 
other measure, and then apply the appropriate constitutional re-
quirements to the facts of the case. 
One reason for the Supreme Court's reluctance to place forfei-
ture into the general scheme of sanctions may be the presently un-
settled divisions between the various forms of sanctions. It has 
become increasingly apparent that the traditional division between 
criminal and civil is inadequate. The civil and criminal labels tell 
only the form of process employed without ever describing the char-
acter of the sanction inflicted. That a suit is labeled civil does not 
imply that it does not impose punishment. Punishment has long 
been inflicted by civil process, as in tort suits assigning punitive 
damages, private qui tam suits, and government civil penalty ac-
tions. Yet, as Professor Clark has pointed out, the recognition of 
punishment in civil suits has been imperfect and the line between 
civil and criminal punishment unclear.176 More imperfect still has 
been the division between what the U.S. Supreme Court has called 
punitive and remedial. Traditionally in American law, ''remedial'' 
corresponded to compensation for a wrong done or repair for an in-
jury suffered. More recently however, the Supreme Court has used 
remedial in a broader sense when the government is plaintiff. Sanc-
174. 416 U.s. 663 (1974). 
175. Id. at 686-88 (citations omitted). 
176. Clark, "Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Con-
stitutional Analysis," 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379,382-84,388-89 (1976). 
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tions which do not strictly repair an injury may nevertheless be de-
scribed as remedial in this broader sense if they protect or promote 
an appropriate governmental function or interest.l77 Since a multi-
plicity of purposes falls within the Court's use of the term "reme-
dial," Professor Clark's choice, "nonpunishment," might appear 
preferable as a neutral description. In this category, whether called 
remedial or nonpunishment, Professor Clark has distinguished sev-
eral different purposes including compensation, regulation (fre-
quently also called prevention), taxation, and treatment.17S For 
present purposes, both procedural forms of punishment, civil and 
criminal, may be treated together, since the choice of process should 
not affect the standing of a forfeiture as against the substantive con-
stitutional guarantees of property and freedom from excessive pun-
ishment. On the other hand, it will be necessary to distinguish 
between the various different forms of nonpunishment, since the ef-
fect of the substantive guarantees will be different depending upon 
the rationale of the sanction involved. For example, a forfeiture 
might be upheld independently as either compensation or as regula-
tion (prevention), but must fall if it fails to satisfy the requirements 
of at least one form of sanction. To test the forfeiture in Calero-To-
ledo then requires reference to the facts of the case, the law in-
volved and comparison to the relevant constitutional guarantees. 
The facts in Calero-Toledo were stipulated at trial in the three-
judge district court. The owner, Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 
was a lessor of pleasure yachts. One of its yachts under long-term 
lease was seized when the lessee was discovered possessing a small 
quantity of marijuana while on board. The lease agreement specifi-
cally prohibited the use of the yacht for unlawful purposes. The 
owner Pearson "did not know that its property was being used ille-
gally for an illegal purpose and was completely innocent of the 
lessee's criminal act."l79 The yacht was subject to forfeiture under a 
Puerto Rican narcotics statute providing for forfeiture of "all con-
veyances . . . which are used or are intended for use, to transport, or 
in any manner to facilitate . . . possession [of a controlled sub-
stance] ."lSO On these facts, can anyone of the Supreme Court's ar-
guments above support this particular forfeiture? 
If the forfeiture is to be upheld as a punitive measure, it must 
be a punishment of a particular person for a specific act or failure to 
act. lSI The forfeiture of the yacht could be a legitimate punishment 
177. See e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
178. Clark, supra n. 176 at 463-91. 
179. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F.Supp. 1337, 1340 (D.P.R. 1973), rev'd 
sub nom, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
180. Id. 
181. Even if one allows punishment in the absence of blameworthiness, one must 
still require a specific act or failure to act to invoke the punishment. If there is noth-
ing that the person subjected to punishment did or should have done that causes the 
punishment, then the punishment is wholly random. See Arendt, Origins of Totali-
tarianism 433, 466-68 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing the important role of random punish-
ment in a totalitarian state). 
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of the criminal who possessed the marijuana.l82 That punishment of 
the criminal would not however explain why Pearson is penalized 
and not compensated. Pearson may not have been guilty ofa crime, 
but it must have done something or failed to do something to war-
rant a punitive sanction.183 The Court said it was prepared to up-
hold the forfeiture of the interests of wholly innocent lessors in 
order to induce them "to exercise greater care in transferring pos-
session of their property." In denying Pearson compensation, the 
Supreme Court noted that there had been "no allegation . . . that 
the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its 
property put to an unlawful use."184 In other words, the Court ap-
pears to say that the forfeiture statute involved imposes an affirma-
tive duty on citizens to guarantee that their property is not used 
illegally.185 Failure in that duty then supports penalizing the citizen 
by taking his property. But the Court does not give any indication 
of the source of its determination that the legislature has imposed 
such a duty. Assuming that eviq.ence of such a legislative intent 
could be found, it is doubtful that the imposition of a duty of this 
nature could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Perhaps the legisla-
ture might permissibly make an owner responsible for whatever use 
is made of particularly dangerous property, but not of ordinarily 
harmless property. The facts of Calero-Toledo show the absurdity of 
such an absolute duty. The government itself cannot keep mari-
juana out of its jails and army bases, where it has far more efficient 
means of supervision than the lessor has over his customers. The 
only way Pearson Yacht Leasing could assure that its property is 
never used for illegal purposes would be to stop leasing yachts. 
If the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo cannot be upheld as a punish-
ment, perhaps it can be endorsed as some form of "nonpunishment" 
(or remedial measure). The Supreme Court raises a preventive ra-
tionale when it suggests that the forfeiture serves to insure that the 
yacht is not put to further illegal use. But the Court does not ex-
plain why such a drastic means as forfeiture was permissible when 
a far less burdensome means not affecting the property rights of an 
innocent owner was available to protect the community. The pub-
lic's need for protection would have been equally satisfied by taking 
the yacht from the lessee and returning it to Pearson Yacht Leasing. 
There was no suggestion that the particular yacht involved was 
more likely to be used unlawfully than any other yacht. The yacht 
was not specially outfitted to serve criminal purposes. There was no 
reason to deny the innocent yacht leasing company the return of the 
vessel. The mere possibility that the property might be used in the 
future for illegal purposes cannot be sufficient without more;186 that 
182. Here it is possible that such a punishment would be excessive. 
183. The failing required of Pearson may not have to be culpable, but there must 
be some act or failure to act that can be pointed to. See n. 181 supra. 
184. 416 U.S. at 690. 
185. Cf. n. 63 and accompanying text supra. 
186. The necessary "something more" is not supplied by the past illegal use by the 
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possibility exists with any property and would justify the forfeiture 
of any vessel or vehicle. Here there were no tangible criteria show-
ing a probability of further illegal use. A German court looking at a 
similar situation would almost surely disallow the forfeiture for fail-
ure to show the requisite necessity.187 It might also question the 
forfeiture on proportionality grounds, since the commercial value of 
the yacht is great and the danger to the community of de minimis 
use of marijuana slight.188 Furthermore, a German court might 
doubt the appropriateness of forfeiture when the vessel is merely 
the locale of possession and not the means.189 In any case, even if 
the forfeiture could somehow be upheld as a preventive measure, a 
German court would require compensation to the innocent leasing 
company to the full commercial value of the interest taken.190 
American courts should recognize, as their German counterparts al-
ready have, that the burden of a preventive forfeiture should not fall 
on the innocent owner, but upon the community-at-large which, af-
ter all, the preventive forfeiture is designed to serve. 
Although it appears that the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo cannot 
be sustained on either of the two major grounds of punishment or 
prevention, the taking of the yacht might still be upheld on other 
grounds. The Supreme Court suggests that the forfeiture serves as 
an "economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofita-
ble."191 By this the Court may mean that the forfeiture is analogous 
to a monetary penalty. If so, the objections to applying a punitive 
measure to the facts of Calero-Toledo, already discussed above, ap-
ply and the forfeiture cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the 
Court may be alluding to a rationale similar to that of the German 
sanction of deprivation of the profits of crime.192 Yet it is hard to 
find profit in the mere possession of marijuana. On the facts of 
Calero-Toledo, it seems impossible. The only conceivable profit 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Company received from the crime was the 
portion of the rental above the company's costs paid by the lessee. 
In the ordinary commercial case, that percentage would be only a 
small fraction of the company's overall interest in the vessel. To 
reach that small interest can hardly justify taking the whole yacht. 
lessee. In the hands of Pearson, there is no more likelihood of this yacht being used 
illegally than any other of Pearson's yachts. 
187. See n. 99-108 and accompanying text supra. Professor Clark has indepen-
dently reached an analysis of American "preventive" forfeiture law that is very simi-
lar to the German. See Clark, supra n. 176 at 479-81. 
188. See n. 112-13 and accommpanying text supra. 
189. See n. 109-11 and accompanying text supra. Three American courts have 
made essentially this distinction. See Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1978). State 
v. One 1972 Grand Prix 2-Door Hardtop, 242 N.W.2d 660 (S. Dak. 1976); State v. One 
Porsche 2-Door, 526 P.2d 917 (Utah 1974). These three cases require "transportation 
to accomplish possession" instead of mere "transportation with possession"; this rule 
has been explicitly rejected in the federal system. See United States v. One Clipper 
Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977). 
190. See n. 125-34 and accompanying text supra. 
191. 416 U.S. at 687. 
192. See n. 145-48 and accompanying text supra. 
664 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
In any case, Pearson's "profit from crime" is so attenuated from the 
criminal act that, coupled with Pearson's own total lack of complic-
ity, it is inconceivable that any portion of the rental can qualify as a 
profit of crime subject to deprivation. 
Finally, in a footnote, the Supreme Court suggests yet another 
potential rationale on which to uphold the forfeiture. The forfeiture, 
we are told, can serve as a valid means of compensating the govern-
ment for the costs of enforcing the criminallaw.193 Professor Clark 
has discussed the constitutional infirmities of requiring the criminal 
defendant to make such "compensation." Clark concludes that ordi-
nary government expenses cannot be recovered as compensation, 
arguing that damages exceeding actual damages should be consid-
ered punitive in public law just as they are in private law.194 In 
Calero-Toledo, as we have seen, punitive measures cannot be sup-
ported. Recovery of any actual damages presumably would be 
based on some kind of tort theory. But no theory of tort liability 
would allow the government compensation as claimed in Calero-To-
ledo. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company was not shown to have been 
negligent. Nor can the element of exceptional danger necessary to 
strict liability be found in Pearson's ordinary leasing of yachts. On 
either theory of liability, Pearson cannot be shown to have been the 
legal cause of damage suffered by the government. Nor can the 
value of the yacht be shown to relate to the damages suffered. The 
difficulties present in Calero-Toledo are not unusual; they are apt to 
arise in any compensatory forfeiture suit. Thus, although a forfei-
ture might theoretically be upheld as a compensatory measure, it is 
unlikely that in practice any such scheme could ever be satisfactory. 
In conclusion, while in Calero-Toledo the Supreme Court raised 
valid reasons to support some forfeitures, the Court failed to justify 
ordering the forfeiture in the case before it. The Court should re-
consider its decision. It should begin a restructuring of American 
forfeiture law based upon analysis of each individual forfeiture 
against the rationale raised to support it. The Court should recog-
nize, as its German counterpart did a quarter century ago, that for-
feiture can be justified in a constitutional state only if based upon 
the culpable conduct of the owner or upon a real danger to the com-
munity. 
193. 416 U.S. at 687 n. 26. 
194. Clark, supra n. 176, at 469-75. 
